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The 48 members of the Ezemvelo Farmers’ Organisation (EFO) in KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa (SA), that are fully-certified as organic farmers were surveyed in 
October-December 2004 to assess their perceived levels of satisfaction, trust, 
cooperation and commitment in a formal supply chain producing amadhumbes (a 
traditional vegetable tuber), potatoes and sweet potatoes for a major SA supermarket 
group. Empirical recursive models show that a high level of satisfaction in the working 
relationship results in these farmers trusting the pack-house agent more. High levels of 
trust, in turn, lead to higher levels of both commitment to, and cooperation in, the 
supply chain. A simultaneous-equation model showed that EFO members with higher 
levels of commitment tend to be more cooperative, and that members with higher levels 
of cooperation tend to be more committed toward the working relationship. These 
results suggest that strategies to improve the working relationship with the pack-house 
agent need to promote satisfaction, trust, cooperation and commitment. For example, 
co-investment in better crop storage facilities at farm-level would promote satisfaction 
and hence trust. There is also scope for more cooperation in the planning of new 
organic crop products to grow and market, and to remove some price uncertainty by 
giving EFO farmers more information about prices that they will be paid by the pack-
house in this supply chain.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A marked increase in consumer demand for healthier foods in South Africa 
(SA) since 1999 has led SA supermarket chains to look for new sources of 
organically (chemical-free) produced foods (Darroch, 2001; Business Times, 
2004). This presents opportunities for limited resource, smallholder farmers 
who already practice organic farming methods to earn higher incomes by 
producing crops for this niche market. Research on ways to integrate 
smallholder farmers into such markets can, in turn, help to improve 
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knowledge management, raise household incomes and stimulate economic 
growth (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (DGTZ, 2002). 
These outcomes would also help to develop sustainable rural livelihoods and 
to contribute to alleviating rural poverty. This requires analyzing the organic 
crop supply chain to identify key relationship aspects that need to be 
managed, and what links need to be strengthened.  
 
This paper analyzes key relationships between farmers and the pack-house 
agent in the current organic crop supply chain accessed by the smallholder 
Ezemvelo Farmers’ Organisation (EFO) in KwaZulu-Natal, SA, to grow and 
market amadhumbes (a traditional vegetable tuber), potatoes, and sweet 
potatoes. A supply chain is defined as a set of relationships among suppliers, 
manufacturers, distributors and retailers that facilitate the transformation of 
raw materials into final products (Mukhtar et al, 2002). The EFO members sell 
these crops via informal supply chains to neighbours and hawkers (local 
traders), and via a formal supply chain to one agent who owns a pack-house 
and sells the products on their behalf to a major nationwide supermarket 
chain. The study argues that satisfaction, trust, commitment and cooperation 
are key requirements for a successful long-term business relationship between 
EFO members and this agent in the formal supply chain. Satisfaction relates to 
an overall evaluation of the relationship between supply chain members, and 
is, therefore, an indicator of the benefit from their relationship (Skinner et al, 
1992). Trust exists when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability and integrity (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  Trust thus creates the belief 
that the partner will act in a way that results in positive outcomes for the other 
party and will not take unexpected actions that result in negative outcomes 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990).  
 
Cooperation describes a process by which parties develop mechanisms to 
interact and form business relationships for mutual benefit. Higher levels of 
cooperation are expected to improve business coordination, leading to better 
human and product performance (Smith et al, 1995). Commitment is shown 
when a supply chain partner believes that an ongoing business relationship 
with another player is so important as to warrant trying to maintain it 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994). This implies that ‘enduring commitment is a basic 
requirement for successful supply chain implementation’ (Kwon & Suh, 
2005:27). Many authors have tried to model these supply chain relationships 
using recursive models (see Kwon & Suh (2005) for a summary of this 
research), but none have used a simultaneous-equation approach to meaningfully 
validate the behavioral variables in these relationships. Locally, for example, 
Hardman et al. (2002) applied empirical recursive models that showed that 
high levels of trust lead to high levels of cooperation, and in turn, high levels 
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of commitment to working relationships in the SA fresh apple export value 
chain. Masuku et al (2004) showed that cooperation depended on trust, and 
commitment depended on cooperation, between smallholder sugarcane 
farmers and millers in the Swaziland sugar industry.   
 
This paper, therefore, extends past international and local research by 
modeling both recursive and simultaneous relationships between trust, 
commitment and cooperation in a supply chain, using data obtained from the 
EFO organic farmers. To the authors’ knowledge, it is the first attempt in the 
literature on supply chain management to try and estimate the simultaneous 
complex interrelationships between these variables. The next section develops 
a conceptual model of relationships between satisfaction, trust, cooperation 
and commitment, and specifies the study research hypotheses. Section 3 
describes data sources and the research methodology, and specifies the 
empirical recursive and simultaneous-equation models. Section 4 compares 
and contrasts the estimated recursive and simultaneous-equation models of 
these relationships. A concluding section discusses some management and 
policy implications of the results.   
 
2.  Conceptual models of the working relationship  
 
Conceptual models were developed to analyse the levels of, and links 
between, satisfaction, trust, cooperation and commitment in the working 
relationship between EFO members and the pack-house agent. The EFO 
members’ perceptions of these aspects of the working relationship were 
evaluated using two recursive models of cooperative behavior that were then 
combined into a simultaneous-equation model: the first model is based on 
work by Anderson & Weitz (1991), Campbell (1992), Smith et al (1995), 
Schroder et al (2000), Hunt et al (2002), and Claro et al (2003), while the second 
model is the Key Mediating Variable (KMV) model proposed by Morgan & 
Hunt (1994).  
 
The first model postulates that high levels of satisfaction and trust are 
precursors for high levels of cooperation and, subsequently, human resource 
commitment in the supply chain. Causality thus runs from 
SATISFACTION→TRUST→COOPERATION→COMMITMENT. This model 
supports Mould & Starr’s (2000) contention that cooperative behavior 
demands commitment of resources and sharing of proprietary information. 
All parties in the working relationship have a stake in the outcome of 
cooperative behavior to ensure ongoing commitment (Mentzer, 2001). The 
initiation of cooperation requires trust, and high levels of cooperative behavior 
result in commitment. “Once trust is established, firms learn that coordinated, 
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joint efforts will lead to outcomes that exceed what the firm would achieve if it 
acted solely in its own best interest” (Anderson & Narus, 1990:45). 
 
The KMV model suggests a different causality link between the latter two 
relationships, advocating that causality rather runs from 
SATISFACTION→TRUST→COMMITMENT→COOPERATION. Both of these 
models imply that the EFO members need to perceive relatively high levels of 
satisfaction in their working relationship with the pack-house agent before 
they can develop trust in this relationship. Given the competing views on the 
causality between cooperation and commitment, both models will be 
estimated separately as recursive models that follow the links described 
above, and then combined into a simultaneous-equation model. The concepts 
of satisfaction, trust, cooperation and commitment are described in the 
following sections before the study hypotheses for these models are defined. 
 
2.1   Relationship satisfaction and trust 
 
For members to perceive high levels of trust, they should also perceive high 
overall satisfaction with the relationship (Schroder et al, 2000). Overall 
satisfaction is the overall evaluation of the relationship between channel 
members, and, therefore, a measure of the outcome of the buyer-seller 
relationship (Skinner et al, 1992). Trust reflects the extent to which one party 
believes that its requirements will be fulfilled through future actions 
undertaken by the counterpart (Anderson & Weitz, 1989), and shows an 
individual’s confidence in the goodwill of others and belief that others will 
make efforts consistent with the groups’ goals. Anderson & Narus (1990) 
define trust as a firm’s belief that another company will perform actions that 
will result in positive outcomes for the firm and will not take unexpected 
actions that result in negative outcomes. Trust, therefore, refers to the shared 
belief that in the long run, rewards will be distributed fairly among partners. 
When trust is operative, the risk of opportunism (i.e. getting advantages in an 
unprincipled way) is reduced. Long term relationships and trust encourage 
effective communication between players in the supply chain (Claro et al, 
2003).  
 
Without trust, there is a culture of suspicion in working relationships (Mason 
& Lefrere, 2003). Hunt et al (2002) found that mutual trust must be present 
before a strategic alliance can flourish. Relationships characterized by trust are 
so highly valued that potential supply chain partners will desire to commit 
themselves to the supply chain (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). An environment of 
trust is also conducive to coordinative behaviour (Claro et al, 2003), although 
Mason & Lefrere (2003) argue that high levels of cognition-based trust may be 
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a principal predictor of “free riding” (one party may willingly take advantage 
of the other’s trust in him or her). The presence of trust implies that the actions 
or outcomes of the trading parties will be acceptable and tend to serve the 
interest of all (Claro et al, 2003).   
 
 
2.2 Relationship  cooperation 
 
Cooperation is a departure from the anchor point of discreteness that 
underlines spot-market transactions toward a relational, bilateral exchange 
(Claro  et al, 2003). The outcomes of such cooperation are effective 
coordination, resulting in lower administrative costs and higher performance 
(Smith et al, 1995). Thus, in relational bilateral exchange, cooperative behavior 
entails activities undertaken jointly, and communication between the parties. 
Joint action comprises joint planning and joint-problem solving (Claro et al, 
2003). When one partner’s actions influence the ability of the other to compete 
effectively, the need for jointly set goals, long-term plans, responsibilities and 
expectations increases. Cooperative relationships can enhance supply chain 
performance as partners work together to try and achieve mutual gains 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  
 
The scope of supply chain enhancement depends on the nature of the supplier 
relations in the chain, with the closeness of the relationships being one of the 
defining factors. Long-term cooperation may produce more net benefits for the 
exchange partners than are available from the traditional competition-based 
arrangements. Such long-term cooperation has to be accompanied by the 
commitment to the relationship, trust and proactive customers and suppliers. 
These benefits often enhance the competitive position of both the producer 
and the buyer, resulting in a ‘win-win’ situation (Burnes & New, 1996; 
Mukhtar  et al, 2002). The adapted models that are specified in Section 3 
assume that cooperative behavior does not continue unless the expected 
benefits equal or exceed the expected costs (Smith et al, 1995). This cooperative 
behavior rests upon sharing information, knowledge, risks and profits 
(Mentzer, 2001), and it continues on the strength of trust. Stronger cooperative 
behaviour makes exiting from the business relationship undesirable, and 
causes a deeper commitment from the players to reevaluate their linkages over 
time and to implement necessary changes to make the supply chain perform 
better (Doz, 1996). 
 
The KMV model proposes that trust and commitment are precursors of 
cooperation (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Cooperation also depends on the 
relationship costs (in the EFO case this refers to membership fees, time 
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attending meetings, increased input expenditure, etc.) that members incur in 
order to participate in the supply chain (Smith et al, 1995). Members can have 
ongoing disputes about business goals, but continue to cooperate due to 
relatively low relationship costs. Mould & Starr (2000) emphasized that both 
parties to the cooperative relationship must have the required capabilities to 
deliver. If capabilities exist, the commitment of management and resources is 
required to cope with disagreements over working details and procedures.   
Without resources (both capital and people), the benefits of cooperative 
relationship will lose visibility and eventually the psychological and physical 
boundaries that separate organizations will overcome the links. Excessive 
cooperation has potential to bring bias, conformity and economic collusion 
(Smith et al, 1995). Mould & Starr (2000) also point out that cooperation may 
demand the sharing of sensitive proprietary information.  
 
2.3 Relationship  commitment 
 
The enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship (Moberg, 2003) implies 
some vulnerability for each party, as mistrust decreases commitment and 
shifts the transaction to one of more direct short-term exchanges. Loyalty leads 
to superior business performance, and it needs commitment. A partner 
committed to the working relationship will likely cooperate with the other 
because of the desire to make the relationship work and vice versa. The 
outcomes of commitment can include higher motivation and an increased 
sense of belonging to the relationship. The development of trust, cooperation 
and commitment can treated as a dynamic process where participants 
constantly evaluate their decision to continue in such a relationship (Claro et 
al, 2003; Smith et al, 1995). 
 
The above discussion on relationship satisfaction, trust, cooperation and 
commitment suggests the following research hypotheses to investigate the 
conceptual models: 
H1:  The higher are the levels of satisfaction that the EFO farmers have in their 
working relationship with the pack-house agent, the higher are their levels of trust. 
H2: The higher are the levels of trust that the EFO farmers have in their working 
relationship with the pack-house agent, the greater will be their levels of cooperation, 
as shown by higher levels of joint-problem solving and communication. 
H3: The higher are the levels of trust that the EFO farmers have in their working 
relationship with the pack-house agent, the more human resources they will commit to 
this relationship. 
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H4:  The higher are the levels of cooperation that the EFO farmers have in their 
working relationship with the pack-house agent, the more committed they will be to 
this relationship. 
H5: The higher are the levels of commitment by the EFO farmers to their working 
relationship with the pack-house agent, the more cooperative they are likely to be in 
this relationship. 
 
3.   Data sources and research methodology 
 
Primary data were collected from EFO members between October and 
December 2004 in the Embo district of KwaZulu-Natal, SA. The EFO has 151 
members from 127 households, and 48 members were fully-certified as organic 
farmers at the time of the study. To qualify for full certification, farmers must 
meet the following specifications (Modi, 2004): (a) the land on which organic 
foods are grown must be free of prohibited substances, such as commercial 
fertilizers, for a given period (usually three years before certification); (b) 
farmers and processors must keep detailed records of the methods and 
materials used in the growing or processing of organic produce; and (c) all 
methods and materials must be annually inspected. 
 
All of the 48 EFO fully-organic certified growers were personally interviewed 
to obtain their perceptions of (a) their levels of trust, joint-problem solving, 
communication and commitment in the working relationship with the pack-
house agent; and (b) their levels of cooperation in production planning, 
harvesting, scheduling, marketing and quality control. Perceived levels of 
trust in their working relationship were estimated using an index derived 
from their scores on Likert-type scales that showed how strongly they agree 
with statements such as “We have a strong personal confidence in each other”, 
“We have a strong business confidence in each other”, “We can always rely on 
each other when it counts”, “ This agent will work hard in future to maintain a 
close relationship with EFO”, “I am very confident that this relationship will 
continue in future”, “This agent is trustworthy” and “This agent has always 
been fair in his negotiations with us” (see Appendix 1A).  
 
Respondents had to rate these statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 4 (strongly agree). An index of the level of trust perceived by each EFO 
farmer was then estimated taking his/her average score over all the relevant 
statements that relate to the above aspects of trust. For example, if a grower 
scores 2, 2, 1, 4, 3, 1 and 1 for the statements, he/she scores 2 on the level of 
trust index ([2+2+1+4+3+1+1]/7). Index values close to 4 show relatively high 
perceived levels of trust, while values closer to one suggest low levels of trust 
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in the working relationship.  The 48 respondents’ perceived levels of 
cooperation and commitment in the working relationship with the pack-house 
agent and in organic crop production planning, harvest scheduling, marketing 
and quality control were similarly estimated by the average of their respective 
Likert-type scores (see Appendix 1A and 1B) for statements that describe each 
of these behaviours. For example, the statements “We often discuss issues such 
as changes in customers needs for organic products” and “We have extensive 
formal communications” show the communication component of cooperation, 
while the statements “We make joint decisions about reducing costs in the pack-
house” and “We make joint decisions about organic product delivery 
scheduling” reflect the joint-problem solving component of cooperation. 
Statements such as “We work together to achieve productivity gains from 
which we both benefit” and “We devote considerable time to trying to improve 
this relationship” capture the growers’ perceptions of the levels of commitment 
in their working relationship with the pack-house agent. 
 
3.1 Empirical  recursive  and  simultaneous-equation models 
 
An empirical recursive model (see Gujarati (2003) and Koutsoyiannis (1987) 
for model properties) was first used to test hypotheses H1, H2 and H4, 
assuming that causality runs from 
SATISFACTION→TRUST→COOPERATION→COMMITMENT. These 
hypotheses give the following equations, where the signs on the β coefficients 
indicate the expected direction of the relationship between the dependent and 
explanatory variables: 
Trust = β1  +  β2Satisfaction  +  µ1   (1) 
Cooperation = β3  +  β4Trust  +  µ2   (2) 
Commitment = β5  +  β6Cooperation  +  µ3.   (3) 
where µ1…..µ3 are the error terms. 
A second recursive model was then estimated to test hypotheses H3 and H5 in 
the KMV model using the causal links 
SATISFACTION→TRUST→COMMITMENT→COOPERATION in the 
following equations: 
Trust = β1  +  β2Satisfaction  +  µ1   (1) 
Commitment = β7  +  β8Trust  +  µ4   (4) 
Cooperation = β9  +  β10Commitment +  µ5   (5) 
where µ4 and µ5 are the error terms. 
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Note that the first equation in this model is the same as equation (1) in the first 
model. The simultaneous-equation model combining the two recursive models 
required more explanatory variables in order to identify the individual 
equations (provide sufficient information to estimate the coefficients (Gujarati, 
2003)). Following Rozemeijer et al. (2003) and Morgan & Hunt (1994), variables 
representing the costs of maintaining the working relationship, and price 
uncertainty, were, therefore, added to give the following simultaneous-
equation model: 
Trust = β1  +  β2Satisfaction  +  µ1   (1) 
Cooperation = β11  +  β12Trust  +  β13Commitment  -  β14RCOSTS  +  µ6 (6) 
Commitment = β15  +  β16Trust  +  β17Cooperation  -  β18PUNC  +  µ7 (7) 
where RCOSTS = Relationship maintenance costs;  PUNC = Price uncertainty, 
and µ6 and µ7 are the error terms. Note again that the first equation in this model 
is the same as the first equation that was specified in the two recursive models. 
 
The RCOSTS variable in equation (6) reflects the extent to which the 48 EFO 
growers perceived that costs such as “Membership fees”, “Time attending 
meetings”, “More work effort in crop production”, and “Increased expenditure 
on hired labour and other farm inputs” ranged from 1 (none) to 4 (excessive) on 
a Likert-type scale (see Appendix 1C). These costs can be interpreted as barriers 
that negatively affect the desire to cooperate across players in the supply chain 
(Rozemeijer et al, 2003). The PUNC variable in equation (7) shows the growers’ 
perceived level of uncertainty about the price that they would receive for their 
organic crops from the pack-house, on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (no 
problem) to 3 (severe problem).  Following Morgan & Hunt (1994:25), supply 
chain partners that expect positive relationship benefits from their partnership – 
relative to other options – on such dimensions as product profitability, will be 
more committed to the working relationship. Price uncertainty will create 
uncertainty about expected profits, and, hence, uncertainty about the EFO 
members’ expected relationship benefits. The inclusion of RCOSTS and PUNC 
thus generates two further research hypotheses: 
H6: The higher are the perceived levels of relationship maintenance costs that EFO 
farmers must incur to participate in the formal organic crop supply chain, the lower 
will be their levels of cooperation.  
H7: The higher are the EFO farmers’ perceived levels of price uncertainty, the lower 
will be their levels of commitment to the working relationship. 
 





This section first discusses the 48 fully-certified organic EFO farmers’ scores 
for perceived levels of trust, cooperation and human resource commitment; it 
then estimates the recursive models, and the simultaneous-equation model for 
comparison. The farmers’ perceptions about their levels of cooperation with 
the pack-house agent in organic crop production and marketing activities are 
also discussed.  
 
4.1  Index scores for EFO farmers’ perceived levels of trust, cooperation 
and human resource commitment 
 
The mean, minimum and maximum index scores showing the 48 EFO farmers’ 
perceived levels of trust, cooperation (joint-problem solving and 
communication) and human resource commitment in their working 
relationship with the pack-house agent are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table  1:  The 48 fully-certified organic EFO farmers’ scores for their perceived 
levels of trust, joint-problem solving, communication and commitment in 






Index Score  Mean Score 
Standard Deviation 
of the Mean 
Trust 1.00  4.00  2.76  0.527 
Communication 1.00 4.00  2.73  0.451 
Joint-problem solving  2.00  3.80  2.88  0.313 
Commitment 1.50  3.75  2.66  0.417 
Note:  aScores range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and show to what extent these farmers agree 
or disagree with statements about aspects of their working relationship with the packer. Scores closer to 1 
suggest weak aspects of the relationship, while scores near 4 indicate strong aspects. 
 
Scores for this EFO farmer-agent link ranged from a minimum of 1 for trust 
and communication to a maximum of 4 for the same aspects of the working 
relationship. Mean scores close to 3.00 for all four aspects of the relationship 
suggest that these 48 EFO producers, on average, perceived relatively high 
levels of trust, joint-problem solving and communication in their relationship 
with the packer, and that they are fairly strongly committed to this 
relationship. About 21% of these farmers perceived relatively low levels of 
trust, 33% low levels of communication, 8% low levels of joint-problem 
solving, and 46% low levels of commitment. These results suggest that there is 
scope to improve commitment by these farmers to the working relationship by 
further strengthening communication and joint-problem solving, and working 
towards building more trust.  
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4.2 Recursive  models 
 
The three equations estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for 
the first recursive model, assuming that the error terms are uncorrelated with 
the endogenous explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2003: 764), using the SPSS 
statistical package (Norusis, 1994) were (estimated t statistics in parentheses 
and df = degrees of freedom):  
 
Trust = 1.278  +  0.531Satisfaction  (8) 
(5.316)*** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37  F = 28.26***  df = 47 
 
Cooperation = -3.315  +  1.200Trust  (9) 
(5.556)*** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.39  F = 30.87***  df = 47 
 
Commitment =  2.661  +  0.271Cooperation  (10) 
(5.800)*** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.41  F = 33.64***  df = 47 
 
The triple asterisk *** indicates statistically significant coefficient estimates at 
the 1% level of significance for all equations. In equation (8), higher levels of 
perceived overall satisfaction with the working relationship lead to higher 
levels of trust. Equation (8) is statistically significant (F=28.26), and variance in 
satisfaction explains about 37% of the variance in trust. In equation (9), higher 
levels of trust, in turn, encourage more cooperation by the EFO members in 
the organic crop supply chain activities. Equation (9) is statistically significant 
(F=30.87), and the variance in trust explains 39% of the variance in 
cooperation. Equation (10) indicates that the level of cooperation has a positive 
impact on the level of commitment. This equation is also statistically 
significant (F=33.64), and variance in cooperation accounts for 41% of the 
variance in commitment. These results support hypotheses H1, H2 and H4 that 
were proposed in section 2.3 of this paper. 
 
The first recursive model was re-estimated by the Method of Instrumental 
Variables (Koutsoyiannis, 1987:376) to allow for possible violation of the 
assumption that the error terms were uncorrelated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables. The original Trust variable in equation (9) was replaced 
by the instrumental variable (TrustIV) that was estimated from equation (8), 
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and the original Cooperation variable in equation (10) was replaced by the 
instrumental variable CooperationIV that was estimated by regressing 
Cooperation on Satisfaction (the exogenous variable in the recursive model). 
The estimated model equations using the SPSS statistical package (Norusis, 
1994) were (estimated t statistics in parentheses): 
Trust = 1.278  +  0.531Satisfaction  (8) 
(5.316)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37  F = 28.26***  df = 47 
Cooperation = -5.057  + 1.839Trust IV  (11) 
(5.130)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.36  F = 26.32***  df = 47 
Commitment = 2.657  +  0.438Cooperation IV  (12) 
(5.491)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.40  F = 30.15***  df = 47 
Equations (11) and (12) are both statistically significant (F=26.32 and 30.15, 
respectively). Variance in TrustIV explains 36% of the variance in cooperation, 
while variance in CooperationIV accounts for 40% of the variance in 
commitment. The positive, statistically significant coefficient estimates in all 
three equations again support hypotheses H1, H2 and H4  in section 2.3, 
although the adjusted R2 and F statistics are marginally lower using the 
instrumental variables. 
The three equations estimated by OLS regression for the KMV recursive 
model, assuming that the error terms are uncorrelated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2003: 764), using the SPSS statistical package 
(Norusis, 1994) were (estimated t statistics in parentheses): 
Trust = 1.278  +  0.531Satisfaction  (8) 
(5.316)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37  F = 28.26***  df = 47 
Commitment = 1.465  +  0.437Trust  (13) 
(4.492)*** 
Adjusted R2 =  0.29  F = 20.18***  df = 47 
Cooperation =  -4.145  + 1.557Commitment  (14) 
(5.800)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.41  F = 33.64***  df = 47 
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The triple asterisk *** indicates statistically significant coefficient estimates at 
the 1% level of significance for all equations. Equations (13) and (14) show that 
trust and commitment are key antecedents for cooperative behavior. Both 
equations are statistically significant (F=20.18 and 33.64, respectively). 
Variance in trust explains 29% of the variance in commitment, while variance 
in commitment accounts for 41% of the variance in cooperation. These results 
support hypotheses H1, H3 and H5 in section 2.3 of this paper.   
 
The KMV recursive model was also re-estimated using instrumental variables 
to again allow for possible violation of the assumption that the error terms 
were uncorrelated with the endogenous explanatory variables. The original 
Trust variable in equation (13) was replaced by the instrumental variable 
(TrustIV) that was estimated from equation (8), and the original Commitment 
variable in equation (14) was replaced by the instrumental variable 
CommitmentIV that was estimated by regressing Commitment on Satisfaction 
(the exogenous variable in the recursive model). The estimated model 
equations using the SPSS statistical package (Norusis, 1994) were (estimated t 
statistics in parentheses): 
Trust = 1.278  +  0.531Satisfaction  (8) 
(5.316)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37  F = 28.26***  df = 47 
Commitment = 0.443  +  0.805TrustIV  (15) 
(5.491)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.40  F = 30.15***  df = 47 
Cooperation = -6.069  + 2.284CommitmentIV  (16) 
(5.130)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37  F = 26.32***  df = 47 
Equations (15) and (16) are statistically significant (F=30.15 and 26.32, 
respectively). Variance in TrustIV explains 40% of the variance in 
commitment, while variance in CommitmentIV accounts for 37% of the 
variance in cooperation. The positive, statistically significant coefficient 
estimates in all three equations again support hypotheses H1, H3 and H5 in 
section 2.3 of this paper.  
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4.2  Simultaneous-equation model  
 
Equations (1), (6) and (7) were all identified, but multicollinearity was detected 
in equations (6) and (7) at Stage 2 when Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
(Gujarati, 2003) was initially used to estimate the simultaneous-equation 
model. The instrumental variable (IV) for the endogenous explanatory 
variable Trust in Stage 2 was statistically significantly correlated with the IVs 
for the endogenous explanatory variables Cooperation and Commitment, and 
with RCOSTS and PUNC, and all variance-inflation factors (VIFs) were greater 
than 10 (Gujarati, 2003). Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was, therefore, 
used in Stage 2 to try and remedy this problem (Manly, 1986; Jones, 1985). This 
technique generates principal components that resemble the original variables 
but are uncorrelated and account for the variation in the original variables in 
descending order (Manly, 1986). 
 
Applying PCA produced three principal components (PCs) for both equation 
(6) and equation (7). The first and second PCs accounted for 99% of the 
variance in the three variables in both equations, and so multicollinearity was 
remedied in each equation by using two PCs and estimating the final 
simultaneous-equation model by 2SLS using the SPSS statistical package 
(Norusis, 1994) (estimated t statistics in parentheses) as: 
Trust = 1.278  +  0.531Satisfaction  (8) 
(5.316)*** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37     F = 28.26***     df = 47 
 
Cooperation = 2.813   +   0.187PC1   -   0.075PC2 (17) 
(5.005)***      (-2.010)** 
 
where PC1 = 0.963TrustIV +  0.993CommitmentIV  -  0.127RCOSTS 
    and PC2 = -0.257TrustIV – 0.025CommitmentIV + 0.992RCOSTS 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.37     F = 14.58**     df = 46 
 
Commitment = 2.665   +  0.244PC3   -    0.118PC4 (18) 
(5.007)***       (-2.432)** 
 
where PC3 = 0.984TrustIV +  0.975CooperationIV  -  0.185PUNC 
    and PC4 = -0.173TrustIV – 0.196CooperationIV  + 0.983PUNC 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.39     F = 15.49**     df = 46 
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The triple asterisk *** and the double asterisk ** indicate statistically significant 
coefficient estimates at the 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively, for 
all equations. TrustIV, CommitmentIV and CooperationIV denote 
instrumental variables for trust, commitment and cooperation, respectively. 
The EFO members that have higher levels of overall satisfaction with the pack-
house agent have higher levels of trust in the working relationship (equation 
(8)). Variance in trust explains about 37% of the variance in overall satisfaction, 
and equation (8) is highly statistically significant (F=28.26). The estimated 
component and regression coefficients for PC1 and PC2 in equation (17) have 
the correct signs. High loadings above 0.900 for the instrumental variables 
TrustIV and CommitmentIV in PC1 imply that EFO members who perceive 
higher levels of trust also tend to have higher levels of commitment, which 
together via the positive coefficient estimate for PC1 lead to higher levels of 
cooperation. The high loading on RCOSTS in PC2 contrasts higher levels of 
relationship maintenance costs with lower levels of trust, and the negative 
coefficient estimate for PC2 indicates that levels of cooperation fall as these 
costs rise. Variance in PC1 and PC2 explains 37% of the variance in 
cooperation, and equation (17) is highly statistically significant (F=14.58). 
 
In equation (18), the estimated component loadings and regression coefficients 
for PC3 and PC4  again agree with a priori reasoning. Higher levels of trust 
associated with higher levels of cooperation shown in PC3 lead to higher levels 
of commitment to the working relationship, while higher levels of price 
uncertainty in PC4 cause lower levels of commitment. Variance in PC3 and PC4 
accounts for 39% of the variance in commitment, and equation (18) is highly 
statistically significant (F=15.49). The estimated equations thus support 
hypotheses H1 to H5 in section 2.3, and H6 and H7 in section 3.1, of this paper. 
Higher levels of satisfaction lead to higher levels of trust that, in turn, promote 
cooperation and commitment by EFO members in the formal organic crop 
supply chain. Higher perceived costs of maintaining the working relationship 
and more price uncertainty, respectively, reduce levels of cooperation and 
commitment. There is also some evidence of a two-way, or simultaneous, 
relationship between cooperation and commitment. 
 
4.3  Cooperation in organic crop production and marketing activities 
 
In Table 2, the EFO farmers view cooperation with the pack-house agent as 
“relatively high” in organic crop marketing and crop quality control, 
“moderate” in production planning and harvest scheduling, and “low” to 
“moderate” in the planning of new products to grow and market.  
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Table 2: The 48 fully-certified organic EFO farmers’ scores for their perceived levels 
of cooperation with the pack-house agent in key production and marketing 
activities in the formal organic crop supply chain, KwaZulu-Natal, 2004 







of the Mean 
Crop production 
planning 
1 5 3.10  1.12 
Crop harvest 
scheduling 
1 5 3.29  1.03 
Crop marketing  1  5  3.85  0.85 
Crop quality control  1  5  3.74  0.81 
Planning to produce 
new products 
1 5 2.53  0.93 
Note:  a  Scores were based on these farmers’ perceptions of the level of cooperation for each production and 
marketing activity in the formal organic crop supply chain, and could range from 1 (very low cooperation) 
to 5 (very high cooperation). 
 
The latter result may reflect the farmers’ concerns about a new variety of sugar 
beans that they had recently planted but was not purchased by the pack-house 
agent. Production planning, harvest scheduling and new product planning 
thus seem to be the activities where more cooperation is needed.  
 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
 
Results show that if the 48 fully-certified organic EFO farmers have higher 
levels of overall satisfaction in their working relationship with the pack-house 
agent, they will have higher levels of trust. Higher levels of trust, in turn, are a 
key antecedent for both more cooperative behaviour and more commitment to 
the supply chain relationship.  There is also evidence that cooperative 
behaviour and commitment can influence each other positively, supporting 
the concept of simultaneous-equation modelling of these aspects of the 
working relationship. The 48 farmers’ levels of cooperation will also tend to 
fall as the perceived costs of maintaining the supply chain relationship 
increase. Finally, these farmers would tend to commit more human resources 
to the working relationship when they perceive less price uncertainty for the 
organic crop products that they sell through the pack-house.  
 
Satisfaction, and hence more trust, in the formal organic supply chain working 
relationship could be built if the pack-house agent and the EFO members work 
together to develop resources, opportunities and benefits (e.g. price 
premiums) that are superior to the offerings of alternative partners. For 
example, the 48 respondents identified more reliable transport to the pack-
house and co-investment in better crop storage facilities at farm-level as 
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potential ways to improve crop quality, prices and net returns. Currently there 
is no empowerment label for EFO organic products sold by the major 
nationwide supermarket chain at the retail link. This label could earn price 
premiums for the EFO farmers via brand loyalty from higher-income 
consumers that are willing and able to pay relatively more for such a product, 
but further research is needed to establish if the expected costs of developing 
the label would be less than the expected price premiums. The 48 EFO farmers 
overall expressed moderate satisfaction with the working relationship with the 
pack-house agent during the survey, but price uncertainty for products sold 
tends to reduce their commitment to the working relationship. Continuous 
and open communication to share information between and among supply 
chain partners can help to reduce such uncertainty (Kwon & Suh, 2005). This 
may enable the EFO farmers to better plan which crop combinations to grow 
and what areas to allocate to each crop. Communication, which is a 
component of cooperation, could be improved between the retailer and the 
pack-house agent so that the agent can communicate better with the EFO 
members about crop production schedules and market quality expectations, 
and evaluations of the farmers’ crop deliveries.  
 
Preis (2003) recommended that performance evaluation systems be kept as 
objective as possible and that all parties share purchasing decision criteria in a 
supply chain. In this case, these comments apply to the pack-house agent 
better informing EFO farmers about organic crop quality standards and why 
their crop deliveries are sometimes rejected. Improved information flows 
between the EFO farmers and the pack-house agent through education, 
technology development, and extension could also enhance commitment to 
the working relationship. To offset the relationship maintenance (transaction) 
costs, the EFO farmers could try to negotiate higher premiums for the organic 
crops sold through the pack-house. The EFO farmers may also consider 
developing new formal markets in which consumers are prepared to pay a 
premium for crop products that meet organic quality standards. 
 
Finally, there is some scope for improving cooperation between EFO members 
and the pack-house agent in organic crop production planning, and planning 
to produce new varieties. This will increase the likelihood that organic crops 
are produced and harvested on schedule for the retailer. Actions that reduce 
overall satisfaction, trust, cooperation and commitment reduce the 
competitiveness of the study organic crop supply chain. Lessons learnt from 
the study could be adapted to help to improve the performance of, and/or 
develop new, organic crop supply chains for smallholders in other provinces 
in SA, and in other countries in Southern Africa. Areas for future research 
suggested by this study include identifying the sources of price uncertainty in 
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this formal organic crop supply chain, and further analysis of the power 
relations that exist between the partners. For example, the EFO farmers’ lack of 
relative bargaining power may, in part, be responsible for perceived relatively 
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Appendix 1A: Questions used to capture the 48 KwaZulu-Natal EFO farmers’ 
perceptions about the levels of satisfaction, trust, cooperation (joint-problem 
solving and communication) and commitment in their working relationship with 
the packer. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your 
working relationship with the agent at the pack-house? 
Statement 
Strongly  
Agree Agree  Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree 
Trust:       
We have a strong personal confidence in each other         
We have a strong business confidence in each other         
We can always rely on each other when it counts         
This agent will work hard in the future to maintain a close 
relationship with EFO  
     
I am very confident that this relationship will continue in 
the future 
     
This agent is trustworthy         
This agent has always been fair in his negotiations with us         
        
Communication:       
We often discuss issues such as changes in customers 
needs for organic products 
     
We have extensive formal communications         
We have extensive informal communications         
We discuss only need-to-know information that relates 
directly to our relationship 
     
        
We make joint decisions about:       
Reducing costs in the pack-house         
Organic product delivery scheduling         
Organic product quality control         
Improving organic product quality         
New organic products to grow         
       
Commitment:       
We work together to achieve productivity gains from 
which we both benefit 
     
We devote considerable time to trying to improve this 
relationship 
     
We devote considerable time trying to improve pack-
house productivity 
     
We have made major changes in our delivery schedule in 
order to deal more effectively with the pack-house 
     
 
How satisfied are you with your working relationship with the agent at the pack-
house over the last season (tick where appropriate)?  
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Appendix 1B: Questions used to capture the 48 KwaZulu-Natal EFO farmers’ 
perceptions about the levels of cooperation in key crop production and marketing 
activities with the pack-house agent in the organic crop supply chain. 
 
How do you describe the level of cooperation between you and the agent at the 
pack-house in the following activities (tick where appropriate): 
Activity  Very High  High  Moderate  Low  Very Low 
Organic crop production planning           
Organic crop harvest scheduling           
Organic crop marketing           
Organic crop quality control           
Planning to produce new organic crops           
 
 
Appendix 1C: Questions used to capture the 48 KwaZulu-Natal EFO farmers’ 
perceptions about relationship maintenance costs incurred by being an EFO 
member in the organic crop supply chain. 
 
What costs does EFO actually impose on you? Rank perceived costs from 1 to 4, 










Cost item        
        
Membership fees         
Time attending meetings          
More work effort in crop production         
Increased expenditure on hired labour and other farm 
inputs 
      
Other: Please specify         
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